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Amend Title 15 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating 
to Courts, so as to Substantially Revise, Supersede, and Modernize 
Provisions Relating to Juvenile Proceedings and Enact 
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice Reforms Recommended by the 
Governor’s Special Council on Justice Reform in Georgia; Provide 
for Purpose Statements; Provide for Definitions; Provide for 
General Provisions; Provide for Juvenile Court Administration; 
Provide for Dependency Proceedings; Provide for Venue; Provide 
for Taking Children into Care; Provide for Preliminary Protective 
Hearings; Provide for Petitions Alleging Dependency; Provide for 
Summons and Service; Provide for Preadjudication Procedures; 
Provide for Adjudication; Provide for Predisposition Social Study; 
Provide for Family Reunification Determinations; Provide for 
Disposition of Dependent Children; Provide for Permanency Plan 
Hearings for Dependent Children; Provide for Permanent 
Guardianship; Provide for Termination of Parental Rights; Provide 
for Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights and Summons; Provide 
for Hearings on such Petitions; Provide for Grounds for 
Terminating Parental Rights; Provide for Disposition of Children 
Whose Parental Rights Have Been Terminated; Provide for 
Children in Need of Services; Provide for Formal Court 
Proceedings for Children in Need of Services; Provide for 
Preadjudication Custody and Release of Children in Need of 
Services; Provide for a Petition Seeking an Adjudication that a 
Child is a Child in Need of Services; Provide for Adjudication, 
Disposition, and Reviews; Provide for a Permanency Plan for 
Children in Need of Services; Provide for Children with Mental 
Health Issues; Provide for Delinquency; Provide for Custody and 
Release of a Child Including the Use of Detention Assessments; 
Provide for Intake and Arraignment; Provide for Informal 
Adjustment; Provide for a Petition Alleging Delinquency and 
Summons; Provide for Preadjudication Procedures for 
Delinquency Proceedings; Provide for Transfers to Superior Court; 
Revise Designated Felony Acts; Provide for Adjudication of 
Delinquency; Provide for Predisposition Investigation and Risk 
Assessments; Provide for Disposition Hearings for Delinquent 
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Children; Provide for Permanency Plans for Delinquent Children; 
Provide for Traffic Offenses; Prohibit Secure Confinement under 
Certain Circumstances; Provide for Competency in Delinquency 
Cases; Provide for Parental Notification of Abortions; Provide for 
Access to Hearings and Records; Provide for Emancipation of 
Minors; Provide for the Office of the Child Advocate for the 
Protection of Children; Amend Section 52 of Article 3 of Chapter 5 
of Title 42 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to 
Classification and Separation of Inmates Generally and the 
Placement of Inmates, so as to Provide for the Detention of 
Children in the Department of Corrections under Certain 
Circumstances; Amend Chapter 4A of Title 49 of the Official Code 
of Georgia Annotated, Relating to the Department of Juvenile 
Justice, so as to Change Provisions Relating to the Duties of the 
Board of Juvenile Justice; Change Provisions Relating to the 
Duties of the DJJ; Amend the Official Code of Georgia Annotated 
so as to Conform Provisions to the New Chapter 11 of Title 15 and 
Correct Cross-References; Provide for Related Matters; Provide for 
an Effective Date and Applicability; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and 
for Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A. §§ 1-2-8 (amended); 
 5-7-1 (amended); 13-3-20 (amended); 
15-11-1 to -41 (amended); 15-11-50 
to -69 (amended); 15-11-100 to -113 
(amended); 5-11-125, -130, -131, -132,  
 -133, -135, -145, -146, -150, -151,  
 -152, -153, -160, -161, -162, -163,  
 -170, -180, -181, -190, -191, -200, 
  -201, -202, -203, -204, 15-11-210  
  to -218 (amended); 15-11-230, -231,  
 -232, -233, -240, -241, -242, -243,  
 -244, -260, -261, -262, -263, -264,-265,
 -270, -280, -281, -282, -283, -284, -28
5, -300, -301, -302, -303, -310, -311, -3
20, -321, -322, -323, -380, 
381, -390, -400, -401, -402, -403, -404,
 -405, -410, -411, -412, -413, -414, -41
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5, -420, -421, -422, -423, -424, -425, -4
40, -441, -442, -443, -444, -445, -450,  
 -451 (amended); 15-11-470 to -481 
(amended); 15-11-490, -500, -501, 
  -502, -503, -504, -505, -506, -507,  
 -508, -510, -511, -515, -520, -521,-522,  
 -523, -530, -531, -532, -540, -541,-542,
 -543, -544, -545, -546, -560, -561,  
 -562, -563, -564, -565, -566, -567,-580,
 -581, -582, -590, -600, -601, -602,  
 -603, -604, -605, -606, -607, -608,-620,
 -621, -622, -630 (amended); 
15-11-650 to -660 (amended); 
15-11-680, -681, -682, -683, -684, 
  -685, -686, -687, -688 (amended); 
15-11-700 to -710 (amended); 
15-11-720, -721, -722, -723, -724,-725,
 -726, -727, -728, -740, -741,-742,-743,
 -744, -745, -746, -747 (amended); 
15-18-6.1 (new); 15-23-7, -10 
(amended); 16-5-45, -52 (amended); 
16-11-101.1, -127.1, -132 (amended); 
16-12-1, -141.1 (amended); 17-4-25.1 
(amended); 17-7-50.1, -130 (amended); 
17-10-1, -14 (amended); 17-14-2 
(amended); 17-15-13 (amended); 
17-16-2 (amended); 19-7-1, -5, -22 
(amended); 19-8-10, -11, -13 
(amended); 19-10A-4, -6 (amended); 
19-13-20 (amended); 20-1A-30 
(amended); 20-2-133 (amended); 
20-2-670, -671, -690.2, -699, -751.2, -7
66.1, -768 (amended); 20-3-660 
(amended); 24-6-603 (amended); 
24-12-21 (amended); 31-22-9.2 
(amended); 35-3-33 (amended); 35-8-2 
(amended); 36-32-10 (amended); 
40-5-75 (amended); 40-6-391 
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(amended); 42-5-52 (amended); 
44-5-41 (amended); 45-9-81, -101 
(amended) 45-20-1 (amended); 
49-4A-1, -2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9,  
 -10, -11, -16, -17 (amended); 
49-5-3, -8, -41, -60, -110, -131, -154, 
 -281 (amended); 52-7-12 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER: HB 242 
ACT NUMBER: 127 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2013 Ga. Laws 294 
SUMMARY: The Act reorganizes, revises, and 
modernizes Georgia’s Juvenile Court 
Code to provide clarity and coherence, 
establish ease in application, and 
promote consistency in outcomes. 
There are eleven independent articles 
within the Act, seven of which are self-
contained and fully integrated sections 
of a particular aspect of juvenile court 
jurisdiction. The Act further reflects 
extensive research and input from 
various stakeholders across Georgia. 
Finally, the Act seeks to decrease 
juvenile justice costs and reduce 
recidivism rates by mandating uniform 
data collection and reporting, 
mandating risk and detention 
assessment instruments, and expanding 
community-based alternatives to 
detention for certain youth offenders. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 2014 
History 
Georgia’s previous Juvenile Court Code (the “code”) was enacted 
in 1971 and codified at Chapter 11 of Title 15 of the Official Code of 
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Georgia Annotated.1 Under that system, juvenile courts handled three 
types of cases: deprivation,2 delinquency,3 and status offenses.4 Over 
the last four decades, the juvenile code was subjected to a patchwork 
of amendments resulting in confusion and frustration among judges, 
lawyers, and other practitioners alike. 5  For example, the code 
contained articles with provisions for both delinquent children and 
deprived children, which created confusion about what process or 
timeline would apply to each category of children.6 Moreover, within 
the last decade, concerns arose that the juvenile code did not reflect 
research-based best practices.7 The combination of these concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. Ga. Appleseed Ctr. For Law and Justice, Common Wisdom: Making the Case for a New Georgia 
Juvenile Code 10 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.gaappleseed.org/children/reports/summary.pdf; 
see also Video Recording of House Judiciary Committee Meeting, Feb. 13, 2013 at 0 min., 0 sec. 
(remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)),  
http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/13_14/2013/committees/judi/judi021313EDITED.wmv [hereinafter House 
Committee Feb. 13 Video]. 
 2. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (2012) (repealed). The code defined a deprived child as “a child who: [i]s 
without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or 
control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health or morals; [h]as been placed for 
care or adoption in violation of law; [h]as been abandoned by his or her parents or other legal custodian; 
or [i]s without a parent, guardian, or custodian Id. 
 3. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(7) (2012) (repealed). The code defined a delinquent child as “a child who 
has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” Id. 
 4. See Ga. Appleseed, supra note 1, at 10. The code defined a status offender as “a child who is 
charged with or adjudicated of an offense which would not be a crime if it were committed by an adult, 
in other words, an act which is only an offense because of the perpetrator’s status as a child.” O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-2(11) (2012) (repealed). 
 5. Ga. Appleseed, supra note 1, at 10; see also Video Recording of House Proceedings, Feb. 28, 
2013 at 1 hr., 32 min., 58 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)), 
http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2013/day-26 [hereinafter House Video Feb. 28] (“[O]ver the years since 
[the juvenile code’s] first adoption . . . as amendments were made, things were changed, put into 
different areas and became very convoluted for the practitioners in the field as well as the judges to try 
and follow.”); House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 51 min., 22 sec. (remarks by Melissa 
Carter, Executive Director, Barton Child Law & Policy Center, Emory University Law School) 
(“Georgia’s [current] juvenile code was enacted initially about 40 years ago and so over the course of 
now four decades, we have had the advantage, the disadvantage perhaps of cobbling together through 
patchwork amendments what now exists as our juvenile code. And in many ways, it’s incoherent. It’s 
inconsistent at points. It’s very difficult to practice under.”). The code was an “organizational mess” in 
part due to changes made over the years in response to case law as well as several different federally 
mandated legislative entitlements. See Telephone Interview with Rep. Mary Margaret Oliver (D-82nd) 
(May 14, 2013) [hereinafter Oliver Interview]. 
 6. See Telephone Interview with Melissa Carter, Executive Director, Barton Child Law & Policy 
Center, Emory University Law School (May 16, 2013) [hereinafter Carter Interview]. 
 7. Soledad A. McGrath, Hon. Velma Cowen Tilley & Lucy S. McGough, The Juvenile Code 
Revision Project: A Model Code for Georgia, State Bar of Ga. Young Lawyers Div. Juvenile Law 
Comm. i (2008), [on file with Georgia State University Law Review]. 
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prompted a series of efforts, beginning in 2004, to revise, reorganize, 
and modernize Georgia’s juvenile laws.8 
Early Efforts 
In early 2004, the Honorable Robin Nash, the President of the 
Council of Juvenile Court Judges at the time, asked the Juvenile Law 
Committee of the State Bar of Georgia’s Young Lawyers Division 
(“YLD”) to revise Georgia’s Juvenile Code. 9  The Georgia Bar 
Foundation provided a grant to the YLD to fund the revision project 
in September 2004.10 In 2005, Senate Resolution 161 created a 
legislative study committee on the juvenile code which provided a 
forum for the YLD to continue its code revision work.11 The YLD 
hired three code reporters including Professor Lucy McGough of 
Louisiana State University, who helped draft the original Georgia 
Juvenile Court Code; Soledad McGrath, a former staff attorney with 
the Barton Child Law & Policy Center; and Juvenile Court Judge 
Velma Tilley to draft a proposed model code.12 In 2006, a statewide 
juvenile justice coalition called JUSTGeorgia formed to “advocate[] 
for improvements in juvenile justice and the underlying social service 
systems that serve Georgia’s children.”13 
The JUSTGeorgia coalition supported the work of the YLD to 
complete the model juvenile code, and together they conducted 
extensive research including “a review of academic literature, 
consultation with experts and practitioners throughout the country, 
and an extensive review of state statutes.”14 JUSTGeorgia further 
gathered input from various stakeholders and practitioners in 
Georgia’s juvenile system to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
the state’s juvenile code and to garner recommendations regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. SR 161, as passed, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see also McGrath, supra note 7, at i. 
 12. McGrath, supra note 7, at i–ii. 
 13. Id. at ii. The JUSTGeorgia coalition’s main partners include Georgia Appleseed, Barton Child 
Law & Policy Center, Emory University Law School, and Georgia Voices for Children. Id. at i. 
 14. Id. at ii. 
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needed improvements.15 The proposed model code was completed in 
early 2008.16 
The Proposed Model Code 
The previous juvenile code was divided into six articles, the first 
of which was further subdivided into nine parts.17 Structurally, the 
proposed model code eliminated the subdivided parts and established 
twelve independent articles designed to be self-contained to minimize 
cross-referencing as much as possible and create a clearer 
document.18 The model code also replaced archaic language with 
new, more effective terminology.19 Substantively, the model code 
balanced best practices with “the complexities of Georgia’s political 
landscape . . . to ensure that the proposed model would not be 
dismissed as wholly unrealistic and unachievable.”20 Noteworthy 
revisions included: 
1. Increase the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to 18 for all 
children; 
2. Provide for the right to qualified and independent counsel to 
all children; 
3. Repeal [Senate Bill (SB) 440] and all other automatic waiver 
laws and allow only for discretionary judicial waiver of juvenile 
court jurisdiction through a transfer hearing; 
4. Remove [thirteen] year olds from eligibility for transfer to 
superior court and for adjudication under the designated felony 
statute; 
5. Ban the secure confinement of children in adult correctional 
facilities; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 15. Ga. Appleseed, supra note 1, at 7. (“For over a year, hundreds of lawyers and other professionals 
logged over 6,500 pro bono hours in identifying, interviewing, and transcribing interviews from a wide 
array of stakeholders, such as parents, young adults and older youth, law enforcement, child welfare 
workers, mental health providers, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, educators, business leaders, 
probation officers and many more . . . In addition, to encourage input from the general community about 
the current juvenile code, Georgia Appleseed held public town hall meetings.”). 
 16. Id. at 10. 
 17. McGrath, supra note 7, at iii. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at iv. 
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6. Add three new articles governing independent living services, 
children in need of services, and competency in delinquency 
proceedings; 
7. Ensure compliance with the requirements of the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act in delinquency and status offense cases; 
8. Require the electronic recording of custodial interrogations in 
certain cases; 
9. Provide for the reinstatement of parental rights; and 
10. Establish a comprehensive procedure for the creation of 
subsidized permanent guardianships.21 
Previous Versions of the Bill 
Senator Bill Hamrick subsequently introduced The Child 
Protection and Public Safety Act as SB 292 at the end of the 2009 
legislative session,22 but the bill did not move out of the Senate.23 
Following revisions based upon further review by legislators and 
various stakeholders, Senator Hamrick reintroduced the legislation as 
SB 127 during the 2011 legislative session.24 An identical piece of 
legislation was also introduced in 2011 by Representative Wendell 
Willard (R-51st) in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) 
641.25 The bill remained active in both chambers of the Georgia 
General Assembly at the close of the 2011 legislative session after 
eleven public hearings and broad bipartisan support.26 
HB 641 and SB 127 were both reintroduced during the 2012 
legislative session. 27  SB 127 unanimously passed the Senate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 21. Id. at v. 
 22. Juvenile Code Rewrite, JUSTGeorgia, http://www.justga.org/initiatives/juvenile-code/sb-292-
the-child-protection-and-public-safety-act (last visited May 26, 2013). The bill was based upon the 
proposed model code developed by the YLD. Id. 
 23. See Telephone Interview with Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st) (May 24, 2013) [hereinafter 
Willard Interview]. There were, however, several Senate Judiciary hearings to continue the deliberation 
and vetting of the legislations. Email from Melissa Carter, Executive Director, Barton Child Law & 
Policy Center, to author (Sep. 2, 2013, 19:41 EST) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 24. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 22. 
 25. HB 641, The Child Protection and Public Safety Act, JUSTGeorgia, 
http://www.justga.org/initiatives/juvenile-code/hb-641-the-child-protection-and-public-safety-act (last 
visited May 26, 2013). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 641, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20112012/HB/641; Georgia General Assembly, SB 127, Bill Tracking, 
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Judiciary Committee, but the bill did not proceed any further.28 HB 
641, on the other hand, proceeded to the House floor and passed out 
of the House unanimously.29 The bill then passed out of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee with unanimous support but did not reach the 
Senate Rules Committee.30 Governor Nathan Deal (R) intervened at 
that point due to concerns about how to fund the changes mandated 
by the proposed legislation.31 Initially, HB 641’s sponsors recognized 
the funding concerns but, nevertheless, moved forward with the bill 
with the intention to set the implementation date far enough down the 
road to allow for legislation to come forward in the next session that 
would address the funding concerns.32 The Governor approached the 
House Judiciary Committee Chairman and bill sponsor, 
Representative Willard (R-51st), and requested he put the bill on hold 
to give the Governor’s Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform 
the opportunity to gather data on Georgia’s juvenile justice system 
and make recommendations for an improved juvenile rewrite bill for 
the 2013 legislative session that would address funding concerns.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20112012/SB/127. 
 28. See Georgia General Assembly, SB 127, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20112012/SB/127. 
 29. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 641, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20112012/HB/641; see also House Video Feb. 28, supra note 5, at 1 hr., 32 min., 58 sec. 
(remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)). 
 30. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 641, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20112012/HB/641. 
 31. House Video Feb. 28, supra note 5, at 1 hr., 32 min., 58 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard 
(R-51st)) (“The Governor had concerns as the rest of us did . . . [that] there were some costs in [HB 641] 
that really were not clearly defined or what would be the cost and where that cost would be placed as far 
as the burden on either state or local governments.”). There had been some pushback to many of the 
proposed changes found in HB 641 from the prosecuting attorneys and also the county governments 
because of concerns that the legislation was building in costs that would be absorbed locally but not 
doing anything to assist with funding these potential expenses at the state level. See Willard Interview, 
supra note 23. Notably, these concerns arose at a time when Georgia’s budget was being cut eighteen 
percent overall. See Oliver Interview, supra note 5. 
 32. See Willard Interview, supra note 23; see also House Video Feb. 28, supra note 5, at 1 hr., 32 
min., 58 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)); House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 
1, at 0 min., 0 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)) (“[W]e recognized there was going to be 
some costs associated with it. But we felt what we would be able to do is have the bill first implemented, 
then putting a date down the road far enough, we could come back, next—this session—[and] begin 
looking at how to best fund it.”). 
 33. House Video Feb. 28, supra note 5, at 1 hr., 32 min., 58 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard 
(R-51st)) (“So the Governor recommended, and I agreed, that we hold the bill up and let the commission 
that had been set up by the Governor . . . look into and review our juvenile practices and see where 
reforms might be necessary.”); see also House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 0 min., 0 sec. 
(remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)) (explaining “we had a commission that was looking at 
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Chairman Willard agreed and HB 641 did not reach a vote on the 
Senate floor in 2012.34 
Governor Deal’s Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform for 
Georgians 
Previously, in March of 2011, “the Georgia General Assembly 
passed House Bill 265 . . . creating both the Special Council on 
Criminal Justice Reform and Special Joint Committee on Criminal 
Justice Reform” (the “Council”) in response to needed reforms 
within the adult criminal justice system. 35  On May 24, 2012, 
Governor Deal (R) extended the term of the Council and expanded 
both its membership and its focus to include the juvenile justice 
system through an executive order.36 The Council was specifically 
tasked with “identify[ing] ways to improve outcomes; develop 
fiscally sound, data-driven juvenile justice policies; and ensure 
Georgia’s tax dollars are used effectively and efficiently.”37 The 
Council commissioned the Public Safety Performance Project of the 
Pew Center on the States and the Annie E. Casey Foundation for 
research and technical assistance.38 For six months, “the Council 
conducted extensive analysis of the state’s juvenile justice data and 
solicited input from a wide range of stakeholders.”39 The Council 
focused exclusively on the issue of juvenile delinquency and made no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adult measures of ways to change programs and better ways to treat sentencing of adults . . . [so] the 
Governor’s plan was to . . . have the commission really look at the juvenile justice reform issues and 
how better ways can be implemented with policies, again for the state, looking at cost overall”). 
 34. House Video Feb. 28, supra note 5, at 1 hr., 32 min., 58 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard 
(R-51st)); House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 0 min., 0 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell 
Willard (R-51st)). 
 35. Meg Buice & Tamara Garcia, Crimes and Offenses HB 1176, 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 290, 294 
(2012); see also HB 265, as passed, 2011 Ga. Gen. Assembly § 1, p. 2–3, ln. 25–84. 
 36. The Special Council On Criminal Justice Reform For Georgians, Report Of The Special Council 
On Criminal Justice Reform For Georgians 2 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/press_release/Report%20of%20the%20S
pecial%20Council%20on%20Criminal%20Justice%20Reform%20for%20Georgians%202012%20-
%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Council Report]. Expanded membership specifically included those with 
juvenile justice expertise. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 37. Council Report, supra note 36, at 4. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. 
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recommendations regarding deprivation aspects of Georgia’s juvenile 
laws.40 
The Council’s Findings 
The Council assessed the policies and costs of current practices 
within Georgia’s juvenile justice system. 41  After reviewing its 
findings, the Council concluded that Georgia’s juvenile justice 
system presented substantial costs to taxpayers without a sufficient 
return on investment.42 Specifically, the Council found that it costs 
the state over $90,000 annually for each juvenile housed in youth 
detention, but “[d]espite these costs, the recidivism rate remains high, 
with more than half of the youth in the juvenile justice system 
committing an offense leading to re-adjudication of delinquency or 
an adult conviction of a crime within three years.”43 The Council 
determined these high rates of recidivism were unacceptable and 
identified five areas in need of reform: (1) misdemeanor and status 
offenders, many of whom were low-risk, comprised a significant 
portion of detained youth, (2) low-risk designated felons comprised a 
significant portion of detained youth, (3) risk and needs assessment 
tools were not being used effectively to inform decision-making, (4) 
many local jurisdictions had limited or no community-based program 
services, leaving juvenile judges with few dispositional options short 
of commitment to state facilities, and (5) the state struggled to collect 
uniform data on juvenile offenders.44 
The Council’s Recommendations 
In December 2012, the Council made fifteen policy 
recommendations to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme 
Court, and Chief Judge of the Georgia Court of Appeals for 
consideration by the upcoming legislature.45 The stated goals of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 40. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 41. Council Report, supra note 36, at 7. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 8. 
 44. Id. at 9–12. 
 45. Id. at 4, 12–20; see also House Video Feb. 28, supra note 5, at 1 hr., 32 min., 58 sec. (remarks by 
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recommendations were to “protect public safety, hold offenders 
accountable, and control juvenile justice costs.” 46  The Council 
projected the recommendations would “decrease the average daily 
out-of-home adjudicated population by 639 offenders by 2018 (from 
1,908 offenders to 1,269 offenders)” which would allow for savings 
of “more than $88 million in averted state expenditures and actual 
savings through 2018.”47 
The report categorized the Council’s recommendations into two 
separate sections.48 The first section contained recommendations to 
“[f]ocus the state’s out-of-home facilities on higher-risk, serious 
offenders” because the state was spending significant resources on 
juveniles who are misdemeanants, status offenders, or low-risk 
offenders without improved public safety outcomes.49 To achieve this 
goal, the Council provided the following recommendations: (1) 
“create a two-class system within the Designated Felony Act . . . that 
continues to allow for restrictive custody in all designated felony 
(DF) cases while adjusting the dispositional sanctions to take into 
account both the offense severity and risk level,”50 (2) “prohibit 
status offenders and certain misdemeanants from being disposed to 
residential facilities,”51 and (3) “implement a performance incentive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)). 
 46. Council Report, supra note 36, at 12. 
 47. Id. at 12. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 13. 
 50. Id. at 14. The Designated Felony Act, at the time, provided for a single sentencing range for an 
entire gamut of offenses ranging in severity from murder to smash-and-grab burglary. Id. When the Act 
was first passed, it included only eleven serious offenses. See House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra 
note 1, at 17 min., 45 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on 
Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). However, over the course of 
thirty-two years, the Act morphed to include nearly thirty offenses including less serious felonies. 
Council Report, supra note 36, at 14. The Council recommended dividing the offenses into two tiers to 
limit the discretion of sentencing judges “to handle sentencing those offenders of less serious 
consequence to no more than eighteen months in secured confinement as opposed to those that are the 
more severe [who could] . . . remain up to sixty months [in] confinement.” House Committee Feb. 13 
Video, supra note 1, at 17 min., 45 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special 
Council on Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). The Council made 
this recommendation based upon its findings that in 2011 “39 percent of designated felons in YDCs 
were assessed as low-risk and 38 percent were in YDCs for non-violent offenses,” costing the state 
$91,126 per bed annually. Council Report, supra note 36, at 14. 
 51. Council Report, supra note 36, at 14–15. Specifically, the Council recommended the legislature 
prohibit judges from sentencing all status offenders to confinement and further limit confinement to only 
those juvenile misdemeanants “who had at least four prior adjudications of delinquency (excluding 
status offenses) including at least one prior felony adjudication.” Id. at 15. This recommendation was, in 
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structure” whereby the state would provide funding incentives to 
localities to create and use community-based alternatives to 
detention.52 
The second category of recommendations aimed at reducing 
recidivism by strengthening evidence based community supervision 
and programs.53 To achieve this goal, the Council recommended 
statutorily mandating the use of decision-making instruments, 
including “risk and needs assessment” and “detention assessment” 
tools.54 Additionally, the Council made recommendations regarding 
effective community-based options, including the establishment of 
administrative probation for certain youth and the funding and 
development of evidence based community programs.55 The Council 
further made recommendations regarding data collection and 
reporting requirements, requiring that all juvenile data be collected 
and reported to the state through a mandated uniform data collection 
and tracking system and that there be a performance measurement 
system created to track such things as “recidivism, education, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
part, based on similar recent restrictions enacted by other states, including Tex. Family Code Ann. 
§ 54.0401 (West, Westlaw through 2013 third called Legis. Sess.), Fla. Stat. § 985.441 (West, Westlaw 
through 2013 Legis. Sess.), Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-278.8 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess., and 
Ala. Code § 12-15-208(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.). Id. It was further based on 
concerns that “[i]n 2011, 53 percent of juveniles in non-secure residential facilities were adjudicated for 
misdemeanors (45 percent) or status offenses (8 percent)” fifty-six percent of whom were considered 
low-risk. Id. at 14–15. 
 52. Council Report, supra note 36, at 15. This recommendation recognizes that community-based 
programs can reduce recidivism and thus save states money by decreasing the number of offenders 
confined in state facilities. Id. The idea is to reward local jurisdictions that successfully reduce 
recidivism with a portion of the state’s savings for the purpose of investing in stronger community-
based options. Id. Further, the recommendation provides communities with no local options with an 
incentive to apply for grant money to create such programs. See House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra 
note 1, at 20 min., 8 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on 
Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). The Governor set aside $5 
million in his budget for fiscal year 2014 as funding for implementation of this recommendation. Id. 
 53. Council Report, supra note 36, at 12. 
 54. Id. at 16. The Council recommended the legislature mandate the use of two assessment 
instruments. Id. First, a detention assessment should be administered prior to detention intake. Id. 
Second, a risk and needs assessment should be administered prior to disposition to inform judges prior 
to sentencing. Id. Finally, the Council recommended that all assessment tools be immediately and 
regularly validated as accurate. Id. Notably, the Council also recommended the legislature mandate 
decision-making tools for the DJJ and probation officers to guide a court’s decisions regarding 
placement recommendations, but this recommendation was not included in HB 242. See infra text 
accompanying note 59. 
 55. Council Report, supra note 36, at 16–18. Specifically the Council recommended that “‘evidence-
based and proven practices’” be defined by the legislation and that funding be limited to those practices 
proven to reduce recidivism. Id. at 17. 
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employment, substance use, and payment of victim restitution”.56 
Finally, there was a recommendation regarding the transportation of 
juveniles to detention centers,57 and a recommendation requiring the 
DJJ to investigate the cost effectiveness of using certain available 
federal funds. 58  Ultimately, only eight of the Council’s fifteen 
recommendations were included in HB 242, as introduced, because 
some of the Council’s recommendations were determined to be more 
appropriately addressed through the budgetary or regulatory 
process.59 
On February 7, 2013, Representative Willard (R-51st) introduced 
the first version of HB 242 to the House of Representatives,60 which 
reflected the great merger of massive reform initiatives undertaken 
by the YLD of the Georgia State Bar and the JUSTGeorgia coalition 
with Governor Deal’s Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform 
for Georgians.61 On the same day, then Georgia Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Carol Hunstein referred to the legislation in her State of the 
Judiciary address noting that “we as Georgians—and as a nation—
stand at a crossroads in juvenile justice history. We have learned, just 
as we did with adult criminal justice, that cracking down on juvenile 
crime is not enough. We must also be smart about juvenile crime and 
take action to reduce it.”62 
Bill Tracking of HB 242 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representatives Wendell Willard (R-51st), Christian Coomer (R-
14th), Matt Hatchett (R-150th), Chad Nimmer (R-178th), Mary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 56. Id. at 18–19. 
 57. Id. at 19–20. Specifically, the recommendation requires the agency that requests the Detention 
Assessment Instrument to transport juveniles to the detention center rather than place that responsibility 
on the local sheriff as was the practice in most counties. Id. at 19. 
 58. Id. at 20. Notably, this requirement was not included in HB 242 as introduced. See infra text 
accompanying note 59. 
 59. House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 17 min., 01 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael 
P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of 
Appeals of Georgia). 
 60. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 242, May 9, 2013. 
 61. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 62. The Honorable Chief Justice Carol Hunstein of the Supreme Court of Georgia, 2013 State of the 
Judiciary Address, Feb. 7, 2013, available at http://www.gasupreme.us/press_releases/13Judi.pdf. 
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Margaret Oliver (D-82nd) and Jay Neal (R-2nd) sponsored HB 242 
in the House.63 On February 8, 2013 and February 11, 2013, the 
House read the bill for the first and second time respectively.64 The 
Speaker of the House David Ralston (R-7th) assigned the bill to the 
House Judiciary Committee, which favorably reported a Committee 
substitute on February 20, 2013.65 
The House Committee made a number of changes to the bill.66 
First, based on circumstances peculiar to the juvenile’s case, the 
Committee amended the bill to provide a variety of detention and 
treatment options.67 In addition, the House Committee clarified that 
“secure probation sanction programs” include confinement in 
nonsecure residential facilities.68 The House Committee, however, 
amended the definition of “foster care” by removing nonsecure 
residential facilities as a detention alternative for children adjudicated 
for delinquent acts.69 Additionally, the House Committee amended 
the bill to provide that, “[a] child who is released from detention but 
subject to conditions of release shall not be considered to be in 
detention for purposes of calculating time served.”70 The House 
Committee also amended the bill by clarifying that a juvenile 
adjudicated to be a dependent child may not, pursuant to the court’s 
contempt power, be placed in nonsecure residential facilities. 71 
Moreover, the House Committee amended the bill to permit a 
juvenile court, in the context of civil commitment, to have a child 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 63. HB 242, as introduced, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 64. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 242, May 9, 2013. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Compare HB 242, as introduced, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 242 (HCS), 2013 Ga. Gen. 
Assem. 
 67. See, e.g., HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 129, ln. 4452–454, 2013 Ga. Gen Assem.; see also Video 
Recording of House Judiciary Committee Meeting, Feb. 19, 2013 at 5 min., 39 sec. (remarks by Rep. 
Wendell Willard (R-51st)),  
http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/13_14/2013/committees/judi/judi021913EDITED.wmv [hereinafter House 
Committee Feb. 19 Video]. 
 68. HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 24, ln. 827–30, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. For consistency, the House 
Committee changed “nonsecure facility” to “nonsecure residential facility” throughout the bill. E.g., id. 
§ 1.1, p. 27, ln. 926. Additionally, the House Committee amended the bill by removing “mandatory 
conference” information throughout the bill. Id. § 1.1, p. 115, 119, 121, 124, ln. 3995, 4107, 4110, 4187, 
4276. See infra note 187 for discussion of the implications of removing the mandatory conference 
requirement. 
 69. Id. § 1.1, p. 9, ln. 308–11. 
 70. Id. § 1.1, p. 132, ln. 4581–83. 
 71. Id. § 1.1, p. 24, ln. 827–30. 
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committed to an “appropriate treatment setting.” 72  The House 
Committee also amended the bill to provide for inpatient treatment 
where a child is found to be incompetent to stand trial.73 
Second, the House Committee redefined “a prosecuting attorney” 
and the role of such attorneys and other parties or entities under the 
amended bill.74 The amended definition acknowledges that state, 
county, and local governments are often under-staffed and ensures 
that a qualified individual attorney will handle juvenile proceedings 
where a district attorney is unavailable.75 Additionally, the House 
Committee amended the bill to allow other individuals, in addition to 
prosecuting attorneys, to move that a juvenile is a child in need of 
services (CHINS) and to revoke probation.76 The House Committee 
also amended the bill by expanding a prosecuting attorney’s access to 
juvenile records when necessary to discharge her official duties.77 
Third, the House Committee amended the bill to protect children 
in various phases of the juvenile justice system. The substitute 
prevented children from waiving their right to an attorney where 
liberty is in jeopardy. 78  Additionally, the House Committee 
amendments prohibit courts from accepting a child’s admission of 
guilt at arraignment where her liberty is at risk and an attorney does 
not represent her. 79  To address funding concerns, the House 
Committee also narrowed the language of the bill and the 
circumstances where a child may be examined by a physician or 
psychologist.80Specifically, this amendment clarifies that the court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 72. HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 129, ln. 4452–54, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 73. Id. § 1.1, p. 128, ln. 4423–25. 
 74. Id. § 1.1, p. 12, ln. 410–11. (“‘Prosecuting attorney’ means an attorney designated by the district 
attorney of the judicial circuit in which the juvenile proceedings are instituted . . . . ”). 
 75. Id. § 4-4, p. 221–22, ln. 7679–16. 
 76. Id. § 1.1, p. 121, ln. 4173–78. 
Under HB 242 as introduced, only an attorney could file a CHINS petition. [This] 
amendment reverts back to current law, under which any person can file a petition 
alleging status offenses, provided that the court endorses the petition as being [in] the 
best interests of the child and the community. 
Juvenile Justice Reform Legislation: House Bill 242, JUSTGeorgia, http://www.justga.org/initiatives/ 
juvenile-code/hb-242-juvenile-justice-reform-bill/HB242_Summary_HouseJudyAmendments.pdf/view 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2013); see also HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 126, 127, 129, ln. 4364–367, 4395, 4460–
465, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 77. HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 193, ln. 6697–98, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 78. Id. § 1.1, p. 133, ln. 4603–05. 
 79. Id. § 1.1, p. 145–46, ln. 5035–43. 
 80. Id. § 1.1, p. 22–23, ln. 762–71. 
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may not order the county government to perform a medical 
examination where funding is unavailable.81 
Fourth, the House Committee amended several provisions that 
affect the rights of victims of juvenile crime. The House Committee 
clarified that victims are encouraged to participate in mediation but 
are not required to participate as a condition of being heard in a 
juvenile court.82 Additionally, the House Committee amended the bill 
to clarify that victims of juvenile delinquent acts are “entitled to the 
same rights, notices, and benefits as the victim of a crime committed 
by an adult[.]”83 Furthermore, the House Committee amended the bill 
to establish that procedures for ordering restitution are the same for 
juveniles as for adults and that such orders are enforceable after a 
child reaches the age of twenty-one unlike other juvenile court 
orders.84 
Fifth, the House Committee amendments also clarified several 
procedural issues.85 The House Committee amendments extended the 
time an attorney, declining to prosecute a juvenile in superior court, 
has before filing a mandatory adjudication petition with the 
appropriate juvenile court. 86  The House Committee amendments 
established that a complaint filed thirty days after a child is released 
from preadjudication custody shall be filed within the statute of 
limitations set forth in Chapter 3 of Title 17 of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated. 87  The House Committee amendments also 
establish varying conditions for filing a complaint deadline extension 
following an initial detention hearing.88 
Lastly, the House Committee amendments clarified potential 
evidentiary issues. The House Committee amendments granted courts 
additional authority where a party fails to comply with discovery 
requests.89 Moreover, the House Committee clarified a provision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 1.1, p. 20, ln. 4651–52. 
 83. HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 134, ln. 4651–52, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 84. Id. § 1.1, p. 161–62, 172, ln. 5580–90, 5942–45. 
 85. E.g., id. § 1.1, p. 101, ln. 3497 (clarifying the proper service of summons). 
 86. Id. § 1.1, p. 153, ln. 5286–88. 
 87. Id. § 1.1, p. 132, ln. 4557–60. Additionally, the House Committee amendments contemplate the 
possibility of a continuance. Id. § 1.1, p. 132, ln. 4565–56, 4575–76. 
 88. HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 147, ln. 5082–89, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 89. Id. § 1.1, p. 152, ln. 5255–63. Additionally, the House Committee amendments broadened what 
the court may order to be produced at a delinquency hearing and established that “[a] delinquency 
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which provides that evidence adduced at a juvenile hearing generally 
may not be used against such child in any proceeding in any court 
except in the establishment of conditions of bail, plea negotiations, 
and sentencing criminal offenses.90 The House Committee clarified, 
however, that nothing in the bill may be construed to prevent 
compliance with tendering confidential information pursuant to a 
search warrant.91 
The House read HB 242 for the third time on February 28, 2013 
and adopted the Committee substitute by a vote of 173 to 0.92 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senator Charlie Bethel (R-54th) sponsored HB 242 in the Senate.93 
After the first reading of the bill on March 1, 2013, Lieutenant 
Governor Casey Cagle (R) referred HB 242 to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.94 
The Senate Judiciary Committee made several changes to the bill. 
The Committee’s amendments affected repeat delinquent acts, the 
effect of delinquent sexual acts, payment of costs associated with 
juvenile proceedings, termination of parental rights, and a variety of 
timing issues. First, the Committee amended the bill’s definition of a 
“Class A designated felony act.” 95  In particular, the Senate 
Committee substitute states that a Class A felony occurs when, inter 
alia, a child was previously adjudicated of committing three felonies, 
“all of which, if committed by an adult, would have been felonies in 
violation of any chapter of Title 16.” 96  The Senate Committee 
applied the revised definitions in other provisions throughout the 
Act.97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proceeding . . . shall be considered a criminal prosecution insofar as the applicability of Article 4 of 
Chapter 13 of Title 24.” Id. § 1.1, p. 19, ln. 658–59. 
 90. Id. § 1.1, p. 191, ln. 6619–26. 
 91. Id. § 1.1, p. 32, ln. 1096–97. 
 92. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 242, May 9, 2013. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Compare HB 242 (HCS), p. 13, ln. 177, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 242 (SCS), § 1-1, p. 6, 
ln. 175–80, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 96. HB 242 (SCS), § 1-1, p. 6, ln. 175–80, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. § 1-1, p. 6, ln. 181–87. 
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Under specified circumstances, the proposed House bill permitted 
an order of adjudication of delinquency to be modified or set aside.98 
The Senate Committee added two circumstances where an order of 
adjudication of delinquency may be set aside.99 Under the amended 
bill, if the crime resulted from a child being “trafficked for sexual 
servitude,” 100  or from a child being “a victim of sexual 
exploitation,”101 then the court order may be modified or set aside. 
Additionally, the Senate Committee amended the bill to permit a 
child’s records to be sealed when the delinquent act resulted from 
trafficking or sexual exploitation.102 
Third, the Senate Committee amended the bill to clarify the 
circumstances that require a county to pay expenses associated with 
juvenile proceedings and child detention.103 Additionally, the bill 
creates a 120-day deadline for judges to certify expenses that qualify 
for county payment.104 
Fourth, the Senate Committee amended the bill altering and 
creating modified timing deadlines in a number of circumstances.105 
The amended bill extended the amount of time CHINS may be held 
in temporary custody or foster care prior to a “continued custody 
hearing.”106 Going further, the Committee increased the time the 
Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) may hold a delinquent child 
from eighteen to thirty months.107 The Committee also changed the 
bill’s effective date from July 1, 2013 to January 1, 2014.108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 98. HB 242 (HCS), § 1.1, p. 25, ln. 860–62, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 99. HB 242 (SCS), § 1-1, p. 25, ln. 866–70, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 100. Id. § 1-1, p. 26, ln. 869. 
 101. Id. § 1-1, p. 26, ln. 870. 
 102. Id. § 1-1, p. 165, ln. 5701–07. 
 103. Id. § 1-1, p. 27, ln. 915–19. 
 104. Id. § 1-1, p. 27, ln. 922–26. 
 105. E.g., HB 242 (SCS), § 1-1, p. 114–15, ln. 3954–81, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 106. Id. § 1-1, p. 114, ln. 3955–61. The revised bill increased the time a child may be held in 
temporary custody from twenty-four to seventy-two hours. Id. Further, it increased the time a child may 
be held in foster care from seventy-two hours to five days. Id. 
 107. Compare HB 242, as passed House, p. 165, ln. 5697–700, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with HB 242 
(SCS), § 1-1, p. 165, ln. 5715–17, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. Additionally, the Committee removed a 
judge’s discretion to transfer high risk juveniles to nonsecure facilities. Id. § 1-1, p. 165, ln. 5718–23. 
 108. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 242, May 9, 2013. The effective date was 
pushed back to allow enough time for judges and trial practitioners to be educated about the changes as 
well as provide departments enough time to understand their responsibilities. See Video Recording of 
Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting, Mar. 13, 2013 at 11 min., 58 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell 
Willard (R-51st)). 
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Fifth, the Senate Committee substitute made changes to HB 242 
regarding the termination of parental rights. The bill creates 
additional methods to terminate parental rights under Code section 
19-7-1. Further, the bill provides that juvenile courts shall have 
original jurisdiction in Article 2 proceedings regarding the 
termination of parental rights. 109  Additionally, the Committee 
amended the bill to permit a superior court to transfer a case to 
juvenile court under certain circumstances.110 
The Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported its substitute 
on March 14, 2013.111 The bill was read a second time in the Senate 
on March 20, 2013.112 On March 21, 2013, the Senate read the bill 
for a third time and passed it by a vote of 47 to 0.113 The House 
agreed to the Senate substitute on March 25, 2013 by a vote of 167 to 
0, and Governor Deal (R) signed the bill on May 2.114 
The Act 
The Act primarily amends Title 15 of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated to revise the juvenile court code and to reform the juvenile 
justice system.115 The Act further amends Title 42 to provide for the 
detention of children in the Department of Corrections under certain 
circumstances. 116  Finally, the Act amends Title 49 to change 
provisions relating to the DJJ.117 
Part I—Juvenile Code 
There are eleven self-contained, fully integrated articles within 
Part I of the Act which are structured to provide clarity and to reduce 
confusion that previously existed in the juvenile courts regarding the 
application of various processes and timelines.118 Significantly, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 109. HB 242 (SCS), § 1-1, p.16, ln. 554–58, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 110. Id. § 1-1, p. 153–54, ln. 5311–21. 
 111. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 242, May 9, 2013. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 to -747 (Supp. 2013). 
 116. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-52(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 117. O.C.G.A. §§ 49-4A-1 to 11, -16, -17 (2013). 
 118. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. The ultimate purpose behind the reorganization is more 
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Act designates separate articles for dependency, delinquency, and 
CHINS proceedings.119 
Article 1—General Provisions 
Article 1 sets forth definitions and principles to guide all juvenile 
court proceedings and articulates the General Assembly’s intent: 
to promote a juvenile justice system that will protect the 
community, impose accountability for violations of law, provide 
treatment and rehabilitation, and equip juvenile offenders with 
the ability to live responsibly and productively[,] . . . to preserve 
and strengthen family relationship[s], . . . to guarantee due 
process of law, . . . [and] to reflect that the paramount child 
welfare policy of this state is to determine and ensure the best 
interests of its children.120 
Further, Article 1 provides seventy-six key definitions, a 
significant increase from the twenty definitions previously provided 
in Georgia’s juvenile court code.121 Notably, the Article provides 
definitions for “abuse,”122 “child in need of services,”123 “dependent 
child”124 and “party.”125 The Article also creates and defines two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consistent and reliable outcomes for Georgia’s children. Id. 
 119. 2013 Ga. Laws 294. 
 120. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 (Supp. 2013). 
 121. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (2009) (prior to 2013 amendment), with O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 
(Supp. 2013). 
 122. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(2) (Supp. 2013). The definition of abuse includes physical, emotional, 
sexual, and prenatal abuse as well an act of family violence in the presence of a child. Id. Georgia’s 
juvenile code previously failed to define abuse. 2013 Juvenile Justice Reform Legislation House Bill 
242, JUSTGeorgia, 1, http://www.justga.org/initiatives/juvenile-code/hb-242-juvenile-justice-reform-
bill/HB242LongSummary_021813.pdf/view (last visited August 12, 2013) [hereinafter JUSTGeorgia]. 
 123. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(11) (Supp. 2013). CHINS is a new designation that replaces what was 
previously referred to as an “unruly” child. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 1. A CHINS is “a child 
adjudicated to be in need of care, guidance, counseling, structure, supervision, treatment, or 
rehabilitation and who is adjudicated to be” habitually disobedient or a status offender, which is a child 
who commits an act that would not be against the law for an adult, such as skipping school, running 
away from school, or violating curfew. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(11) (Supp. 2013). 
 124. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(22) (Supp. 2013). “Dependency” replaces use of the term “deprivation” 
previously used in Georgia to describe cases in which children need court intervention for protection 
from abuse and neglect. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 1. 
 125. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(52) (Supp. 2013). Significantly, this definition clarifies that a child is a party 
to a juvenile court proceeding, which reflects a shift away from “antiquated ideas of children as 
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separate classes of designated felonies.126 The creation of a two-
tiered class system within the Designated Felony Act was a result of 
the Governor’s Council’s recommendations to provide discretionary 
adjustment of penalties based on the severity of the offense and to 
limit sentencing for certain less severe offenses to no more than 
eighteen months in secured confinement.127 
Article 1 further contains provisions regarding exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction; calculation of time for time-limited 
provisions; mediation; factors to evaluate the best interest of a child; 
court-ordered evaluations of children; protection of statements made 
by children in court-ordered screenings; evaluations or treatment; 
court-ordered community-based risk reduction programs; and privacy 
laws within the juvenile court system.128 
Article 2—Juvenile Court Administration 
Article 2 contains nineteen Code sections and creates juvenile 
courts in every county in the state.129 Although Article 2 contains few 
substantive changes, the recommendations of Governor Deal’s 
Special Council (Special Council) are seen throughout the Article. 
For instance, the Special Council recommended several data 
collection and reporting requirements. 130  Article 2 requires the 
collection of statistical data for CHINS, delinquent children, and 
children accused of acts under the Class A or B Designated Felony 
Acts.131 More specifically, Article 2 requires the collection of the 
child’s demographic information, the type and location of the offense 
and the ultimate disposition of the case.132 To aid in data collection, 
Article 2 provides that the Council of Juvenile Courts may inspect 
the records of the DJJ.133 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
property” and “lingering notions that . . . children [in abuse and neglect cases] are just the subject of 
those proceedings and that the only parties should be the state and the parents.” See Carter Interview, 
supra note 6. 
 126. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(12), -2(13) (Supp. 2013). 
 127. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 128. See O.C.G.A. §§ 15-1-3 to -41 (Supp. 2013). 
 129. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-50 to -69 (Supp. 2013). 
 130. Council Report, supra note 36, at 18. 
 131. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64 (Supp. 2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(b) (Supp. 2013). The Council of Juvenile Courts is composed of all judges 
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Additionally, Article 2 establishes continuing educational and 
training requirements for judges exercising juvenile jurisdiction.134 
Under Article 2, all juvenile judges must be qualified.135  More 
specifically, Article 2 requires judges and associate juvenile judges to 
attend at least twelve hours of continuing legal education approved 
by the Council of Juvenile Courts.136 Moreover, associate judges are 
required to practice law for five years, be members of the State Bar 
of Georgia, and possess the same requirements as elected juvenile 
court judges.137 Additionally, in the event that a judge exercising 
juvenile jurisdiction becomes ill or is otherwise disqualified, a judge 
pro tempore, possessing the same qualifications as other juvenile 
judges, will be appointed.138 
Article 3–Dependency 
Article 3 is organized into thirteen parts, contains sixty Code 
sections, and addresses juvenile dependency proceedings.139 In a 
dependency proceeding, a child is at risk of abuse, neglect or 
exploitation from those responsible for her care.140 Consequently, the 
dependent child is in need of the court’s protection. Thus, the 
provisions of Article 3 are crafted so that dependency proceedings 
are conducted expeditiously, provide the greatest protection for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and associate judges exercising jurisdiction over children. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(a) (Supp. 2013). The 
Council has the power to create general policies, promulgate rules, appoint officers and inspect records 
of several state entities. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(b)(1)–(3), (5) (Supp. 2013). The Council is responsible for 
publishing an annual statistical report regarding the work of courts exercising control over juveniles. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(b)(4) (Supp. 2013). 
 134. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-59(d) (Supp. 2013). 
 135. See O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-50, -60, -62(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 136. Associate juvenile judges are individuals appointed by a Juvenile Court Judge. O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-60(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 137. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-60(b) (Supp. 2013). Prior to the Act, dependency proceedings were referred to 
as deprivation cases. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 1. This change both, clarifies the relationship 
between the court and a child in a dependency proceeding and provides consistency with national 
terminology. Id. 
 138. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-62(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 139. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-100 to -113, -125, -130 to -135, -145, -146, -150 to -153, -160 to -163, -170, 
-180, -181, -190, -191, -200 to -204, -210 to -218, -230 to -233, -240 to -244 (Supp. 2013). 
 140. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-100 (Supp. 2013). Additionally, the Act defines the terms “abuse,” “neglect,” 
and “dependent child” in Article 1. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(2), (22), (48) (Supp. 2013). 
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child, and produce lasting results in accordance with the child’s best 
interests.141 
Article 3 recognizes the dependent child as a party with distinct 
interests from her parents and the state in a dependency 
proceeding.142 This is a significant change from the previous view 
that a child is the object of a dependency proceeding.143 Moreover, 
the Article mandates protections to ensure the child’s interests are 
represented in the dependency proceeding.144 For example, Article 3 
mandates the child have both an attorney and a guardian ad litem in a 
dependency proceeding.145 In some circumstances, the juvenile court 
may even appoint a special advocate to a child in a dependency 
proceeding in addition to her attorney and guardian ad litem.146 
Additionally, neither a child nor her representative may waive the 
child’s right to an attorney in a dependency proceeding. 147 
Consequently, the recognition of children as parties goes a long way 
toward placing children on equal footing with their parents and the 
state during a dependency proceeding.148 
Article 3 also establishes strict timelines for dependency 
proceedings and organizes these timing requirements into a single 
Code section.149 As stated above, the provisions of Article 3 are 
crafted so that dependency proceedings are conducted 
expeditiously.150 Consequently, courts may only grant a continuance 
or deviate from the dependency timeline upon a showing of “good-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 141. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-100 to -104 (Supp. 2013). 
 142. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 143. Oliver Interview, supra note 5. 
 144. Id. 
 145. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-103(a), -104(a) (Supp. 2013). Providing children with counsel poses several 
unresolved issues. Carter Interview, supra note 6. In Georgia and across the nation, great variation exists 
between the approaches attorneys use when representing a child in a dependency case. Id. Indeed, the 
Act tackled this question before a national consensus developed. Id. Consequently, the Act may serve as 
model legislation for other states developing similar provisions. See id. 
 146. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-104(d) (Supp. 2013). Recognizing the importance of special advocates’ role in 
juvenile court proceedings, a court may appoint one even where a child’s attorney serves as guardian ad 
litem. Id. The Act defines the term “Court Appointed Special Advocate” or “CASA” more specifically 
in Code section 15-11-2(16). O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(16) (Supp. 2013). However, among other things, a 
CASA is a community volunteer “trained regarding child abuse and neglect, child development, and 
juvenile court proceedings.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(16)(A) (Supp. 2013). 
 147. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-103(f) (Supp. 2013). 
 148. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 149. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-102 (Supp. 2013). 
 150. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-100(2) (Supp. 2013). 
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cause” and only where delay is not contrary to the interests of the 
child.151 Additionally, even where an attorney shows good cause, the 
continuance may only be granted for the amount of time shown to be 
necessary, and the facts that demonstrated good cause shall be 
entered into the court record.152 
Dependency proceedings are conducted in accordance with the 
child’s best interests. When evaluating the child’s best interests, 
courts consider many factors, including “[t]he child’s need for 
permanence, including his or her need for stability and continuity of 
relationships with a parent, siblings, and other relatives.”153 A child 
may be removed from her home during the course of dependency 
proceedings and placed in foster care with Georgia Division of 
Family and Children Services (DFCS).154 Generally, however, prior 
to removal, DFCS has the burden of showing that it made 
“reasonable efforts” to reunite or preserve the family.155 However, in 
eight identified circumstances, DFCS is not required to show that it 
made reasonable efforts to reunite or preserve the family.156 Of those 
eight circumstances, two were introduced in HB 242 to make the 
Article consistent with federal law.157 
The child’s continuing interest in family continuity is considered 
where she is removed from her home and placed in foster care.158 For 
example, when a child is placed in foster care, Article 3 requires the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 151. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-110(a), (b) (Supp. 2013). The Article identifies several circumstances that fail 
to establish good cause. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-110(c) (Supp. 2013). For example, neither the need for 
discovery, a pending criminal trial, nor a joint stipulation on behalf of the parties shall necessarily 
demonstrate good cause. Id. 
 152. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-110(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 153. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-105(b)(9) (Supp. 2013). 
 154. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-135 (Supp. 2013). A child may remain in foster care until she is eighteen 
years of age. After a child reaches the age of eighteen, she may receive additional assistance from DFCS 
in the form of independent living services. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-10(G) (Supp. 2013). Under the Act, 
children that “age out” of foster care may receive independent living services until the age of twenty-
one. Carter Interview supra note 6. It is worth noting, however, that prior versions of the Act would 
have provided independent living services to children until the age of twenty-three. Id. 
 155. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-202(a)(1), (a)(2), (e)(1)(A) to (C) (Supp. 2013). DFCS must show that it made 
reasonable efforts to reunite or preserve the family at “each stage of the proceedings.” O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-202(d) (Supp. 2013). The Article provides guidance to determine whether DFCS’s efforts were 
reasonable. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-202(f) (Supp. 2013). 
 156. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-203(a)(1) to (8) (Supp. 2013). 
 157. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-203(a)(6), (7) (Supp. 2013). Also consistent with federal law, Article 3 
provides that the DFCS need not show reasonable efforts where parental rights to a dependent child’s 
sibling have been terminated and not resolved. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-203(a)(8) (Supp. 2013). 
 158. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-112(a), -135(e) (Supp. 2013). 
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court to order reasonable visitation consistent with the child’s 
developmental needs and best interests.159 Additionally, DFCS shall 
place a dependent child with his or her siblings who are also in foster 
care, or submit a plan describing continuing efforts to place siblings 
together or explaining why such placement efforts are not 
appropriate.160 
After a child is adjudicated to be dependent, the court will hold a 
disposition hearing. Before a court can make a disposition, it must 
consider the DFCS case plan.161 Article 3 sets out factors that should 
be considered when evaluating the case plan.162 During a review 
hearing, the court is required to make certain determinations 
regarding the effectiveness and status of the case plan.163 
Article 4—Termination of Parental Rights 
Article 4 is organized into six parts, contains twenty-three Code 
sections, and addresses the termination of parental rights (TPR).164 
The purpose of Article 4 is to: 
protect a child who has been adjudicated as a dependent child 
from his or her parent who is unwilling or unable to provide 
safety and care adequate to meet such child’s physical, 
emotional, and mental health needs by providing a judicial 
process for the termination of all parental rights and 
responsibilities.165 
While providing judicial process for the TPR, Article 4 
emphasizes timeliness and the protection of constitutional rights as 
well as the child’s interest in stability and permanency.166 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 159. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-112(a) (Supp. 2013). Visitation is presumed to be unsupervised unless 
unsupervised visits are not in the child’s best interests. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-112(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 160. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-135(e) (Supp. 2013). Where a dependent child and her siblings are not placed 
together, DFCS shall provide frequent and ongoing visitation. Id. 
 161. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-213 (Supp. 2013). 
 162. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-213(1) to (5) (Supp. 2013). 
 163. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-216(c)(1) to (8) (Supp. 2013). 
 164. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-260 to -265, -270, -280 to -285, -300 to -303, -310, -311, -320 to -323 (Supp. 
2013). 
 165. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-260(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 166. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-260(a)(2), (4), (5) (Supp. 2013). 
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The Article sets out several reasons why a court may terminate 
parental rights.167 To terminate parental rights, the petitioner must 
prove their case by clear and convincing evidence.168 When a party 
petitions for the TPR, the parent must receive notice.169 Generally, 
the parent may not voluntarily surrender their parental rights to 
another party after the petition is filed.170 However, the parent may 
surrender their parental rights to the DFCS.171 
The Article also provides guidance for determining whether a 
parent has failed to provide parental control and care. 172  This 
guidance varies depending on whether the child is currently under the 
care of the parent.173 Notably, however, the Article clearly states a 
parent’s “reliance on prayer or other religious nonmedical means” is 
not necessarily a ground for finding the parent failed to provide 
proper care.174 
Following the TPR, the dependent child continues to have ties to 
her former parent and siblings.175 First, until a final adoption order is 
entered, the child has the right to collect child support and inherit 
property from her former parent.176 Additionally, similar to a child’s 
right to inheritance, a court preserves ties to the dependent child’s 
siblings until a final adoption order has been entered.177 
Under certain circumstances, a parent may regain parental rights. 
For example, after three years, a child may petition for the 
reinstatement of parental rights.178 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 167. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310(1) to (5) (Supp. 2013). 
 168. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-303 (Supp. 2013). 
 169. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-281 (Supp. 2013). The Article requires that the notice inform the parent of 
their rights and the consequences of a TPR hearing. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-281(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 170. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-265 (Supp. 2013). 
 171. Id. 
 172. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311(a)(1) to (6) (Supp. 2013). 
 173. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311(a), (b) (Supp. 2013). 
 174. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 175. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-261 (Supp. 2013). Additionally, in its TPR order, the court must inform 
the parent of the existence of the Georgia Adoption Reunion Registry. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-320(b)(4) 
(Supp. 2013). 
 176. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-261(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 2013). 
 177. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-261(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 178. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-323 (Supp. 2013). It should be noted, however, that before such a petition is 
granted, several conditions must be met and the court must find that the restoration of parental rights is 
in the child’s best interest. Id. 
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Article 5—CHINS 
Article 5 is organized into seven parts, contains twenty-nine Code 
sections, and creates a framework for dealing with an entirely new 
category of juveniles—CHINS—created by the Act.179 The Article 
“acknowledge[s] that certain behaviors or conditions occurring 
within a family or school environment indicate that a child is 
experiencing serious difficulties and is in need of services and 
corrective action”180 and aims “to provide a child with a program of 
treatment, care, guidance, counseling, structure, supervision, and 
rehabilitation that he or she needs.”181 The Article favors the least 
restrictive environment possible for CHINS and detention is strictly 
limited.182 
The Article sets forth the procedural steps and safeguards involved 
in adjudicating CHINS. First, the Article allows any person to file a 
complaint indicating a child is in need of services and further allows 
any person to file a petition to have the court formally adjudicate a 
child as a CHINS as long as the court determines such a petition is in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 179. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-380 (Supp. 2013); see also discussion supra note 123 and accompanying text; 
JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 1. 
 180. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-380(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 181. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-380(3) (Supp. 2013). Such comprehensive attention to the needs of a CHINS 
will require significant collaboration between agencies that previously have not been required to work 
together. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. The bill, as introduced, required mandatory conferencing to 
address such collaboration. Id. Mandatory conferencing would have convened all the agencies required 
to serve a particular child. Id. However, the General Assembly removed mandatory conferencing from 
the CHINS Article making it unclear how such collaboration will be implemented. Id. Other states 
designate a particular agency—one with the authority to convene all agencies—to every CHINS case. 
See Carter Interview, supra note 6. The lack of a mandatory conferencing provision in HB 242 may 
require further legislation to achieve the level of multi-agency engagement that is necessary to provide 
the services required for CHINS cases. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-410 to 413, -442(b)(9) (Supp. 2013). The Article forbids CHINS 
from being detained in a facility intended for adults. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-412(c) (Supp. 2013). 
Furthermore, the Article only permits temporary secure detention of a minor alleged to be a CHINS if 
she: 1) has run away from home; 2) is habitually disobedient and ungovernable, or; 3) has failed to 
appear at a scheduled hearing. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-412, -413(a) (Supp. 2013). The Act also permits a 
juvenile court to have CHINS detained for up to seventy-two hours following a continued custody 
hearing, but only for the purpose of providing adequate time to arrange for an appropriate alternative 
placement pending the adjudication hearing. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-414(d) (Supp. 2013). Significantly, upon 
determination that a child is a CHINS, Code section 15-11-442(b)(1)–(8) “[r]etains most of the 
disposition options [previously] available for unruly children, including placing the child on probation 
and requiring restitution or community service.” JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 7. However, Code 
section 15-11-442(b)(9) prohibits placement of a CHINS in a secure residential facility or nonsecure 
residential facility. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-442(b)(9) (Supp. 2013). 
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the best interest of the child and the community.183 Importantly, if a 
school brings the complaint, the school must indicate it first 
attempted to address the issue, including any potential disabilities 
causing the child’s behavior, using education approaches.184 Second, 
the Article provides all timeframes applicable to CHINS proceedings 
as well as the appropriate location for the proceedings.185 Third, the 
Article clarifies that a child is entitled to legal representation by an 
attorney at all stages of CHINS proceedings, and that the court may 
appoint a guardian ad litem if deemed necessary to determine the best 
interests of the child.186 Fourth, the Article requires a case plan if a 
child alleged or adjudicated to be a CHINS is placed in foster care.187 
Fifth, the Article outlines timeframes and options for disposition 
following a CHINS adjudication.188 Finally, the Article provides a 
process for serving children found to be “unrestorably 
incompetent.”189 
Article 6—Delinquency 
Article 6 is organized into fourteen parts, contains sixty-three Code 
sections, and addresses “delinquent” acts by juveniles that would be 
crimes if committed by adults.190 The Act “reorganizes and clarifies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 183. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-390, -420 (Supp. 2013). Further, “[t]he petitioner has the burden of proving 
the allegations of a CHINS petition by clear and convincing evidence.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-440 (Supp. 
2013). 
 184. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-390(c)–(d) (Supp. 2013). 
 185. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-400 to -401 (Supp. 2013). Good cause is required for a continuance 
to be granted. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-403 (Supp. 2013). 
 186. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-402 (Supp. 2013). If possible, the court should appoint a CASA, whose role is 
the same as in dependency proceedings under Article 3, to be the guardian ad litem. O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-402(b) and (d) (Supp. 2013). Whenever possible, the court shall appoint the same attorney or 
guardian ad litem for a CHINS if that child was previously represented in a dependency or delinquency 
proceeding. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-402(e) (Supp. 2013). The court is also empowered to order parents, 
guardians, or legal custodians and child-serving agencies to attend CHINS hearings. O.C.G.A. 
§§ 15-11-423 to -425 (Supp. 2013). 
 187. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-404 (Supp. 2013). 
 188. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-441 to -445 (Supp. 2013). An adjudication hearing must be held within sixty 
days of the filing of a petition and a final disposition hearing must be held within sixty days of 
adjudication. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-441(a), -442(a) (Supp. 2013). Previously, disposition hearings were 
required within thirty days of adjudication. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 7 (referring to O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-65 (2012)). A disposition order is limited to two years and must be reviewed after three months 
and then at least every six months until the order expires. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443, -445 (Supp. 2013). 
 189. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-450 to -451 (Supp. 2013). 
 190. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 7–10. 
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the delinquency provisions of” Georgia’s previous juvenile court 
code and makes several significant changes.191 Part 1 of the Article 
aims to balance holding children accountable for their actions with 
efforts to: 1) “mitigate the adult consequences of criminal behavior;” 
2) rehabilitate delinquent children through community based 
programs; and 3) “successfully reintegrate delinquent children into 
homes and communities.”192 Importantly, the Act locates all of the 
timelines for delinquency proceedings in one Code section for clarity 
and ease of reference.193 
Significant changes regarding parties and participants in 
delinquency proceedings include the requirement that a prosecuting 
attorney represent the state in all delinquency matters;194 that only the 
state and the child alleged to be delinquent are parties to delinquency 
proceedings;195 and that the right to representation by an attorney 
may only be waived by the child under limited circumstances, and 
never by a parent.196 The Act further requires that a guardian ad litem 
be appointed if the parent is unable to protect the child’s best interest 
or fails to accompany the child to court.197 Part 1 of Article 6 also 
addresses various matters such as when double jeopardy attaches and 
victims’ rights in delinquency matters.198 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 191. Id. at 7. 
 192. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-470 (Supp. 2013). Reducing recidivism was one of the primary goals of the 
Act and is the driving force behind the focus on evidence based community programs. See House 
Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 20 min., 08 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-
Chair of the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). 
 193. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-472 (Supp. 2013). Continuances are only granted for good cause and for as 
short a period of time as deemed necessary. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-477 (Supp. 2013). 
 194. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-473 (Supp. 2013). 
 195. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-474 (Supp. 2013). Although a parent is not a party to a delinquency 
proceeding, “[a] parent, guardian, or legal custodian of an alleged delinquent child shall have the right to 
notice, the right to be present in the courtroom, and the opportunity to be heard at all stages of the 
delinquency proceedings.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-474(b) (Supp. 2013). An attorney for a child alleged to be 
delinquent does not need a parent’s consent to access “dependency, school, hospital, physician, or other 
health or mental health care records relat[ed to the] child” as long as the child provides written 
permission. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-475(d) (Supp. 2013). 
 196. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-475 (Supp. 2013). A child may not waive representation by an attorney if the 
child’s liberty is in jeopardy. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-475(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 197. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-476 (Supp. 2013). Whenever possible, the guardian ad litem should be a 
CASA. Id. 
 198. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-480, -481 (Supp. 2013). “The victim of a child’s alleged delinquent act shall 
be entitled to the same rights, notices, and benefits as the victim of a crime committed by an adult.” 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-481(a) (Supp. 2013). 
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The Act establishes several new procedural guidelines and 
protections pertaining to preadjudication detention of juveniles 
alleged to be delinquent. Article 6 aims to place an allegedly 
delinquent child “in the least restrictive facility available.”199 First, 
the Article requires the use of a detention assessment to determine if 
a juvenile brought before a court or to a secure or nonsecure facility 
should be detained or released. 200  A detention assessment is a 
standardized tool “that identifies and calculates specific factors that 
are likely to indicate a child’s risk to public safety pending 
adjudication and the likelihood that such child will appear for 
juvenile proceedings.”201 Second, the Article requires all facilities 
used to detain children to collect and share data on the children with 
juvenile courts, the DJJ, the Governor’s Office for Children and 
Families, and the Council of Juvenile Court Judges.202 Third, the 
Article clarifies the circumstances in which an allegedly delinquent 
child age fifteen or older may be detained in an adult jail.203 Finally, 
Article 6 clarifies that allegedly delinquent children are entitled to the 
same right to bail as adults.204 
Article 6 also provides procedural guidance and safeguards for 
juveniles going through delinquency adjudicatory proceedings such 
as intake and arraignment;205 the filing of a petition;206 service of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 199. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-504(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 200. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-505 (Supp. 2013). The Article favors release “unless it appears 
that . . . detention is warranted.” Id. 
 201. O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-1(6) (2013). 
 202. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-504(f) (Supp. 2013). The Governor’s Council was concerned that Georgia did 
not have the necessary data to make certain decisions and recommended the legislature add a uniform 
methodology of collecting, reporting, and tracking data and furthermore that any contracted community 
based programs be audited for a proven reduction in recidivism before contracts could be compensated 
or renewed. See House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 25 min., 38 sec. (testimony by Hon. 
Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court 
of Appeals of Georgia). 
 203. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-504(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 204. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-507 (Supp. 2013). 
 205. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-510 to -511 (Supp. 2013). At intake and arraignment, the Act requires the 
juvenile court to inform the child of the contents of the complaint, the nature of the proceedings, the 
possible consequences following adjudication, and the child’s due process rights. Id. Further, the Act 
clarifies that a court may not accept an admission of guilt at arraignment by an unrepresented child 
unless the child’s liberty is not in jeopardy. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-511(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 206. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-520 (Supp. 2013). The Act changes the previous juvenile law that allowed 
anyone to file a delinquency petition by requiring that an attorney file a delinquency petition. Id.; see 
also JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 8. Further, the petition must state whether a child is being charged 
with a designated felony. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-522(5) (Supp. 2013). The Act also adds factors to consider 
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summons;207 discovery;208 and adjudicatory hearings.209 The Article 
further addresses the transfer of juveniles alleged to have committed 
certain acts to superior court, retaining certain provisions and 
changing or adding others. Notably, the Act retains the provision 
giving superior courts exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile thirteen 
to seventeen years of age accused of murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated 
sexual battery, or armed robbery with a firearm.210 The Act also 
retains the provision granting the superior court concurrent 
jurisdiction with the juvenile court over juveniles alleged to have 
committed an act that would be considered a crime if committed by 
an adult and that would be punishable by loss of life, imprisonment 
for life without parole, or confinement for life in a penal 
institution.211 However, the Act adds criteria the court must consider 
when making an optional transfer determination.212 The Act also 
clarifies that statements made by the child during a transfer hearing 
or evaluation are not admissible if the case is transferred except as 
impeachment or rebuttal evidence.213 If the court orders a transfer to 
superior court, the child is permitted to immediately appeal the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
when deciding if filing a petition or pursuing informal adjustment is in the public and child’s best 
interest. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-515 (Supp. 2013); see also JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 8. The factors 
include: 1) the nature of the alleged offense; 2) the child’s age and prior record; 3) recommendations 
made by the complainant or victim; and 4) whether alternative community programs would more 
effectively serve the child than the formal court system. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-515(a)(2) (Supp. 2013). 
Informal adjustment is not available to children accused of a Class A or Class B designated felony act 
without the prosecutor’s prior consent. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-515(d) (Supp. 2013). 
 207. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-530 to -531 (Supp. 2013). 
 208. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-541 to -546 (Supp. 2013). Essentially, the Act makes it clear the sanctions 
for violating discovery rules in superior court also apply in juvenile court. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 
122, at 9. 
 209. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-580 to -582 (Supp. 2013). 
 210. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560(b) (Supp. 2013). Some legislators would have liked the Act to repeal this 
provision; however, due to the contentious nature of including such a provision, sponsors of the bill 
elected to leave it out for now so the bill would have a better chance of passing. See discussion infra 
notes 323–28 and accompanying text. The Act does allow the district attorney to decline prosecution in 
the superior court for cause after investigation but before indictment. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560(d) (Supp. 
2013). The Act further allows the superior court to transfer cases allegedly involving voluntary 
manslaughter, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, or aggravated sexual battery to the 
juvenile court for extraordinary cause. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560(e) (Supp. 2013). 
 211. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 212. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-562 (Supp. 2013); see also JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 9. The Article 
also allows the court to order a transfer evaluation be conducted to inform the court’s consideration of 
the transfer criteria. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-562(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 213. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-562(c), -563 (Supp. 2013); see also JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 9. 
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decision, which halts further proceedings in superior court until the 
Court of Appeals makes a determination.214 Children under seventeen 
may not be detained in adult facilities—even if their case is 
transferred to superior court—until they reach the age of 
seventeen. 215  Finally, if multiple charges arise from “a single 
criminal transaction,” a single court must retain jurisdiction over the 
charges.216 
Following adjudication, Article 6 provides guidelines for the 
disposition of the adjudicated delinquent child.217 Prior to disposition, 
the Article requires a probation officer or other designated person 
prepare a written investigation report “contain[ing] such information 
about the characteristics, family, environment, and the circumstances 
affecting the child” as will assist in determining the proper 
disposition including the need for treatment or rehabilitation.218 If the 
court orders a physical or mental examination or a risk assessment 
for the child, the report must include the examination or risk 
assessment results.219 The report must be provided to the child’s 
attorney and to the prosecuting attorney at least five days before the 
disposition hearing.220 A disposition hearing must occur within thirty 
days of the adjudication hearing unless “the court makes and files 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 214. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-564 (Supp. 2013). 
 215. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-565 (Supp. 2013). 
 216. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-566(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 217. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-590 to -607 (Supp. 2013). 
 218. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-590(b) (Supp. 2013). The Article lists information that should be included in 
the report. Id. 
 219. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-590(c) and (d) (Supp. 2013). The Act allows the court to order a behavioral 
health evaluation to inform a disposition order and requires the court to do so before ordering restrictive 
custody for a designated felony. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-477 (Supp. 2013). A behavioral health evaluation is 
“a court ordered evaluation completed by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist of a child alleged to 
have committed or adjudicated of a delinquent act so as to provide the juvenile court with information 
and recommendations relevant to the behavioral health status and mental health treatment needs of such 
child.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-471(2) (Supp. 2013). The court must consider a risk assessment if restrictive 
custody is contemplated for the child. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a) (Supp. 2013). A risk assessment is “an 
actuarial tool, approved by the [Board of Juvenile Justice] and validated on a targeted population, that 
identifies and calculates specific factors that predict a child’s likelihood of recidivating.” O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-2(65) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-1(11) (2013). The requirement that the risk assessment 
instruments be validated was a recommendation of the Governor’s Council to the legislature and simply 
means the instruments “be proven to be what they purport to be.” See House Committee Feb. 13 Video, 
supra note 1, at 24 min., 0 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council 
on Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). Previously, juvenile law 
recognized risk assessment tools but did not mandate their use, so courts did not implement or use 
information from risk assessments to make decisions. See Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
 220. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-590(f) (Supp. 2013). 
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written findings of fact explaining the need for delay.”221 All possible 
dispositional outcomes are listed, but the Act favors “the least 
restrictive disposition order appropriate in view of the seriousness of 
the delinquent act, such child’s culpability, . . . the age of such child, 
such child’s prior record, and such child’s strengths and needs.”222 
Furthermore, dispositional orders must be “suited to such child’s 
treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare.”223 
Article 6 also provides guidelines for courts when considering 
restrictive custody based on the seriousness of the delinquent act and 
the juvenile offender’s risk level. First, the court may not order a 
child adjudicated of an act that would be a misdemeanor if 
committed by an adult to be placed in “an institution, camp, or other 
facility for delinquent children operated under the direction of the 
court or other local public authority” unless the child has previously 
been adjudicated “for an offense that would be a felony if committed 
by an adult and [the child has] at least three other prior adjudications 
for [certain delinquent acts].”224 Second, if the court is contemplating 
restrictive custody for a child adjudicated of committing a Class A or 
Class B designated felony, the Act adds factors a judge must 
consider.225 Moreover, if “restrictive custody is ordered for a child 
classified as low risk, the court shall make a specific written finding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 221. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-600(b) (Supp. 2013). The court may proceed directly to the disposition 
hearing following adjudication. Id. 
 222. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a) (Supp. 2013). Credit for time served in a secure or nonsecure 
residential facility during delinquency proceedings must be applied to detention time ordered at 
disposition. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-604 (Supp. 2013). 
 223. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a) (Supp. 2013). Notably, the Act adds unsupervised probation to the list 
of dispositional outcomes available to the court. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a)(4) (Supp. 2013); see also 
JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 10. The purpose of adding unsupervised or administrative probation as 
an option within the juvenile justice system is to “free up caseworkers to focus on youth to whom they 
can have the greatest impact.” House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 25 min., 03 sec. 
(testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform and 
Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). 
 224. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a)(10)(B) and (11)(B) (Supp. 2013). The Governor’s Council looked to 
practices in other states like Virginia, Texas, Florida, and Alabama and concluded that “prohibiting 
status offenders and certain misdemeanors (sic) from residential commitment is an appropriate 
mechanism to return to Georgia’s taxpayers a better public safety and fiscal investment return.” See 
House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 19 min., 16 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. 
Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals 
of Georgia). 
 225. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(b) (Supp. 2013). Factors include: the child’s age and maturity; the child’s 
needs and best interests; the child’s record, background and risk level; the nature of the offense; the 
community’s need for protection from the child; and the victim’s characteristics. Id. 
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as to why placement in restrictive custody is necessary.”226 Third, the 
Act makes several significant changes regarding the length of time a 
child adjudicated of a designated felony must serve in secure 
confinement.227 The Act eliminates mandatory minimum sentences 
and establishes different maximum terms depending on the class 
level of the designated felony.228 The Act further provides DJJ with 
flexibility in its placement of children adjudicated of Class B 
designated felonies, depending on their risk level.229 If the child is 
deemed low-risk, DJJ may assign the child to a nonsecure residential 
facility for the entire term.230 If the child is deemed moderate or high-
risk, the child must serve the first half of the term in restrictive 
custody in a secure residential facility, but DJJ may place the child in 
a nonsecure residential facility during the second half of the child’s 
term.231 Finally, the Act allows a child to move the court for early 
release at any time and further allows a renewed motion to be filed 
six months after the initial motion is denied.232 
Article 7—Competency in Delinquency 
Article 7 contains eleven Code sections and “set[s] forth 
procedures for a determination of whether a child is incompetent to 
proceed.”233 The Article further establishes “a mechanism for the 
development and implementation of competency remediation 
services, when appropriate.” 234  The Act changes previous law 
regarding competency in juvenile proceedings primarily by creating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 226. Id. 
 227. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 10. 
 228. Id. Previously, “if a court determine[d] that restrictive custody [was] required, the child [had to] 
be committed to DJJ for five years and [had to] serve a minimum of one year in secure confinement, 
followed by at least 12 months of intensive supervision.” Id. (referring to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(e) 
(2009)). The Act provides a maximum term of sixty months for Class A designated felony acts and a 
maximum term of thirty-six months, only eighteen of which may be spent in restrictive custody, for 
Class B designated felony acts. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(c) and (d) (Supp. 2013). 
 229. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 10. 
 230. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(d)(3) (Supp. 2013). 
 231. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(d)(2) (Supp. 2013). 
 232. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(f)(2)(A) (Supp. 2013). Previously, a motion for early release could not be 
filed within the first year of restrictive custody and a renewed motion could not be filed for a year after a 
motion was denied. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 10 (referring to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(e)(2) 
(2009)). 
 233. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-650(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 234. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-650(2) (Supp. 2013). 
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different categories of incompetent children—depending on the 
permanency of their incompetency—and establishing different 
responses depending on which category of competency exists in a 
particular case.235 If a child under the age of thirteen is accused of 
committing a serious violent felony, the Act requires the court to 
order a competency evaluation before proceeding unless both parties 
stipulate to the child’s incompetency. 236  If the court orders 
competency remediation services, the Act requires certain 
information to be included in such orders, establishes timelines for 
service providers to report on the juvenile’s progress, and only allows 
a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist to report to the court whether 
the child has achieved competency.237 Finally, the Article establishes 
timelines and other requirements for competency review hearings.238 
Article 8—Parental Notification239 
Article 8, entitled the “Parental Notification Act,” contains eight 
Code sections and addresses the notification of an unemancipated 
child’s parents or guardians where the child seeks to have an 
abortion.240 The Article provides that, “[n]o physician or other person 
shall perform an abortion upon an unemancipated minor[.]”241 A 
person may, however, perform an abortion upon an unemancipated 
child if one of five situations is present.242 First, a person may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 235. See JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 11. Previously the court responded to all incompetent 
children in the same way. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-150 to -155 (2009). First, if the court 
determines a CHINS is currently incompetent but may be remediated, the court must either dismiss the 
petition without prejudice or order competency remediation services for the juvenile. O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-656(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). Second, if the court finds a child alleged to be delinquent is currently 
incompetent but may be remediated, the court may order competency remediation services. O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-656(a)(2) (Supp. 2013). Third, if a juvenile is found to be “unrestorably incompetent . . . the 
court shall dismiss the petition, appoint a plan manager, and order that procedures for a comprehensive 
services plan be initiated.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-658(a) (Supp. 2013). Finally, if a juvenile is found 
temporarily incompetent due to age or immaturity, the court shall proceed as if that juvenile is 
unrestorably incompetent. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-659 (Supp. 2013). 
 236. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-652(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 237. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-657 (Supp. 2013). 
 238. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-660 (Supp. 2013). 
 239. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 11. Article 8 does not make substantive changes to the current 
law, but reorganizes and renumbers relevant Codes sections to correspond with the Act. 
 240. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-680 (Supp. 2013). 
 241. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 242. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(a) and (b); O.C.G.A. § 15-11-686 (Supp. 2013). 
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perform an abortion upon an unemancipated child when a parent or 
guardian accompanies her to the facility for the procedure.243 Second, 
a person may perform an abortion upon an unemancipated child 
when the parent or guardian is notified of the abortion, in person or 
over the phone, at least twenty-four hours before the procedure is 
performed.244 Third, a person may perform an abortion upon an 
unemancipated child when the parent or guardian is notified in 
writing before the procedure is performed.245 The procedure may be 
performed twenty-four hours after delivery of the notice. 246 
Additionally, a child must consent in writing before an abortion may 
be performed under any of the three preceding scenarios.247 
Fourth, a person may perform an abortion on an unemancipated 
child where a court grants the child’s petition of waiver.248 When a 
child petitions the court for a waiver, the court will hold a hearing.249 
The hearing is conducted in such a way as to preserve the child’s 
anonymity.250 Additionally, the court will assist the child in preparing 
a petition,251 and refrain from charging the child fees.252 A court will 
grant a child’s petition for waiver under two circumstances.253 First, 
the court will grant a waiver where the child shows that she is well-
informed and capable of making her own decision independently of 
her parent or guardian.254 Second, the court will grant a waiver where 
the child shows that notifying the child’s parent or guardian is not in 
the child’s best interest.255 
Fifth, a doctor may perform an abortion upon an unemancipated 
child without notifying the parent, where an abortion is required 
immediately based on the physician’s best clinical judgment. 256 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 243. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2013). 
 244. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2013). 
 245. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 2013). 
 246. Id. 
 247. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(a)(2) (Supp. 2013). 
 248. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-682(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 252. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-684(f) (Supp. 2013). 
 253. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-684(c)(1) to (2) (Supp. 2013). 
 254. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-684(c)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 255. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-684(c)(2) (Supp. 2013). 
 256. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-686 (Supp. 2013). 
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Where a person fails to comply with the Parental Notification Act, he 
or she commits a misdemeanor.257 
Article 9—Access to Hearing and Records 
Article 9 contains eleven Code sections and addresses access to 
juvenile court hearings and related records. 258  First, Article 9 
establishes guidelines for access to juvenile court hearings.259 Under 
Article 9, the general public is excluded from juvenile proceedings 
that are not designated as open to the public.260 In most cases, the 
general public may attend juvenile proceedings where that child is 
accused of committing an offense under either the Class A or Class B 
Designated Felony Act. 261  Certain individuals and entities may, 
however, move to close a juvenile court proceeding.262 Additionally, 
the court may exclude individuals from juvenile court proceedings.263 
Indeed, under some circumstances, the court may “temporarily 
exclude” a child from a juvenile court proceeding.264 In some cases, 
where the public is not generally permitted to attend a hearing, such 
as dispositional and dependency hearings, the court may permit the 
public to attend at its discretion.265 
Second, Article 9 establishes guidelines for access to juvenile court 
and related investigatory records. 266  First, the Article sets out 
procedures where by a child may move to seal records of his or her 
juvenile court proceeding. 267  Additionally, Article 9 provides 
guidelines for determining whether a juvenile’s record may be 
sealed.268 Under some circumstances, the court may seal a juvenile’s 
record sua sponte.269 For example, where a child was adjudicated of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 257. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-688 (Supp. 2013). 
 258. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-700 to -711 (Supp. 2013). 
 259. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-700 (Supp. 2013). 
 260. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-700(j) (Supp. 2013). 
 261. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-700(b)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 262. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-700(d) (Supp. 2013). 
 263. Id. 
 264. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-700(g) (Supp. 2013). More specifically, the court may exclude a child from a 
TPR hearing unless allegations of delinquency or CHINS evidence is being heard. Id. 
 265. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-700(b)(5) and (6) (Supp. 2013). 
 266. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-701 to -708 (Supp. 2013). 
 267. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-701(a)(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 268. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-701(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 269. Id. 
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committing a delinquent sexual act as a result of human trafficking or 
sexual exploitation, the court may seal the juvenile’s record on its 
own accord.270 Moreover, a disposition in a juvenile court proceeding 
generally may not be used against the individual in the future.271 
Article 9 also governs access to police records that are related to 
juvenile proceedings.272 For example, juvenile records must be stored 
separately from adult records.273 Additionally, these juvenile records 
are generally unavailable to the public. 274  Some individuals, 
however, may inspect non-public juvenile records.275 
Article 10—Emancipation 
Article 10 contains nine Codes sections and addresses 
emancipation. 276  The Act reorganizes previous juvenile law to 
improve clarity without making substantial changes.277 Emancipation 
terminates the parent’s rights to “custody, control, services, and the 
earnings of the child”278 and may occur in one of two ways.279 
First, emancipation may occur by operation of law when a child is 
validly married, turns eighteen, or is serving in the armed services on 
active duty.280 Second, emancipation may occur pursuant to a petition 
filed with the court.281 In order to file a petition for emancipation, a 
child must be at least sixteen years of age.282 A hearing is held when 
a child petitions for emancipation.283 The court will grant the petition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 270. Id. 
 271. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-703 (Supp. 2013). The Act expands the use of delinquency records in superior 
court to allow records of evidence or disposition from a delinquency case to be used in sentencing for all 
criminal cases whereas previously, such records were only admissible in felony proceedings in superior 
court. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-11-79.1 (2009) (prior to 2013 amendment), with O.C.G.A. § 15-11-703 
(Supp. 2013). 
 272. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-702, -706, -708 (Supp. 2013). 
 273. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-708(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 274. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-708(b) (Supp. 2013). For example, the Act decreases the access school 
officials have to documents pertaining to juvenile proceedings. JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 12. 
 275. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-708(c) (Supp. 2013). 
 276. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-720 to 728 (Supp. 2013). 
 277. See JUSTGeorgia, supra note 122, at 12. 
 278. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(29) (Supp. 2013). 
 279. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-720 (Supp. 2013). 
 280. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 15-11-720(b)(1) to (3) (Supp. 2013). 
 281. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-720(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 282. Id. Under Article 10, a valid petition must meet several requirements. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-721 
(Supp. 2013). 
 283. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-723 (Supp. 2013). 
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if emancipation is in the best interest of the child and the child has 
demonstrated that she is able to care for herself.284 
Article 11—Child Advocate for the Protection of Children 
Article 11, is entitled the “Georgia Child Advocate for the 
Protection of Children Act.”285 The Article contains eight Code 
sections and creates both the “Office of the Child Advocate for the 
Protection of Children” and the “Child Advocate Advisory 
Committee.” 286  First, the Office of the Child Advocate for the 
Protection of Children was created to provide “oversight of persons, 
organizations, and agencies responsible for providing services to or 
caring for children who are victims of child abuse and neglect or 
whose domestic situation requires intervention by the state.” 287 
Additionally, Article 11 establishes procedures for the appointment 
of the Child Advocate (Advocate) and sets out the Advocate’s duties 
and powers.288 For instance the Advocate has the duty to investigate 
complaints regarding agencies, public officials or public agents 
adversely affecting children. 289  In order to implement this 
responsibility, the Advocate is given the power to: investigate 
records; inspect agency facilities, offices, and personnel; and 
communicate with the affected children.290 Moreover, Article 11 
makes it a misdemeanor for any individual to willfully interfere with 
an investigation conducted by the Office of the Child Advocate for 
the Protection of Children.291 
Second, Article 11 creates the Child Advisory Advocate 
Committee.292 Among other things, the Committee is responsible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 284. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-725. During the trial the child bears the burden of proof. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-
724 (Supp. 2013). 
 285. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-740(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 286. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-740 to -747 (Supp. 2013). 
 287. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-740(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 288. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-740(b), -743(1) to (7), -744(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 289. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-743(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 290. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-744(a) to (c) (Supp. 2013). 
 291. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-745(b) (Supp. 2013). Article 11 also prohibits both discrimination and 
retaliation against individuals that file a complaint with the Office of the Child Advocate for the 
Protection of Children. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-745(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 292. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-747 (Supp. 2013). 
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providing a report on the effectiveness of the Office of the Child 
Advocate for the Protection of Children.293 
Part II–The Placement of Juvenile Offenders 
Part II amends Code section 42-5-52 by allowing the DJJ to 
transfer a juvenile age sixteen or older who has committed a 
designated felony act to the Department of Corrections if the juvenile 
“presents a substantial danger to any person at or within a DJJ 
facility.”294 
Part III—Department of Juvenile Justice and Children and Youth 
Services 
Part III amends certain provisions within Chapter 4A of Title 49 
pertaining to the DJJ. The Act defines several new key terms, 
including “child in need of services,” “detention assessment,” 
“evidence based programs or practices,” “juvenile detention facility,” 
“recidivism,” “risk and needs assessment,” and “risk assessment.”295 
The Act further amends Code section 49-4A-2 by adding three 
additional duties for the Board of Juvenile Justice. First, the Act 
requires the Board to consult with the Governor’s Office for Children 
and Families and the Council of Juvenile Court Judges in the 
development of detention assessment, risk assessment, and risk and 
needs assessment tools and to validate those tools at least every five 
years.296 Second, the Act requires the Board ensure that evidence 
based programs and practices are used with children committed to the 
DJJ.297 Third, the Act requires the DJJ to collect and analyze data and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 293. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-747(b) (Supp. 2013). The Committee also meets to discuss patterns of 
treatment and service of children, policy, and potential improvements. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-747(b)(1) to 
(3) (Supp. 2013). 
 294. O.C.G.A. § 42-5-52(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 295. O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-1(2) to (11) (2013). Code section 49-4A-1(1) also clarifies that “Board” 
means Board of Juvenile Justice. O.C.G.A § 49-4A-1(1) (2013). 
 296. O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-2(b)(3) (2013); see also supra note 219 and accompanying text for discussion 
about mandated use of risk assessment tools. 
 297. O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-2(b)(4) (2013); see also O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-3(b) (2013). Moreover, the Act 
requires that any contracts DJJ makes with service providers to delinquent children be performance-
based and include “financial incentives or consequences based on the results achieved by the 
contractor.” O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-7(c) (2013). 
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performance outcomes and provide an annual report to the Governor 
and legislature.298 Finally, Part III amends various statutes to replace 
terms such as “youth development center” and “regional youth 
detention center” with “secure residential facility” and “nonsecure 
residential facility.”299 
Part IV—Cross References 
Part IV amends sixty-two Code sections. 300  Many of the 
amendments within Part IV merely renumber related statutes to 
correspond with the rewrite of the juvenile justice code.301 Other 
amendments change the wording of a related Code section to 
correspond with the language used within the Act.302 Further, some 
amendments reflect the recommendations of stakeholders, such as 
law enforcement.303 Part IV also adds Code section 15-19-6.1 which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 298. O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-2(b)(5) (2013); see also discussion supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
Additionally, the Act specifies the data that must be recorded to evaluate the effectiveness of treatment 
methods. O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-8(n)(1) (2013). The Act authorizes DJJ to access all required records from 
the courts and law enforcement agencies and requires DJJ to cooperate and coordinate with courts, the 
Governor’s Office for Children and Families, and all other agencies involved in the data collection. 
O.C.G.A. § 49-4A-8(n)(1) and (2) (2013). 
 299. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 49-4A-5, -7 (2013). 
 300. O.C.G.A. § 1-2-8 (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(6) (2013); O.C.G.A. § 13-3-20 (Supp. 
2013); O.C.G.A. § 15-8-6.1 (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 15-23-7(e), -10 (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. 
§ 16-5-45(a)(1) and (3) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 16-10-52(a)(3) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-
101.1(c)(3), -127.1(b) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 16-11-132(d) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 16-12-1(a) to 
(c) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 16-12-141.1(c), (e), (g) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 17-4-25.1 (2013); 
O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-50.1, -130 (2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-1(e), -14 (2013); O.C.G.A. § 17-14-2(5) 
(2013); O.C.G.A. § 17-15-13(d) (2013); O.C.G.A. § 17-16-2(c) (2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-1(b), -
(5)(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(d) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-10(a)(4), -11(a)(3)(D), -
13(g) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 19-10A-4, -6 (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 19-13-20 (Supp. 2013); 
O.C.G.A. § 20-1A-30(3) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-133(b)(1), -670(b), -671, -690.2(c) and 
(g), -699, -751.2(d), -766.1, -768(a) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 20-3-660(1)(B) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. 
§ 24-6-603(b) (2013); O.C.G.A. § 24-12-21(q) (2013); O.C.G.A. § 31-22-9.2(c) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. 
§ 35-3-33(c) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2(7)(B), (8)(B) and (8)(B.1) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. 
§ 36-32-10 (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75(g) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(l) (Supp. 2013); 
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-41 (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 45-9-81(7), -101(7) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. 
§§ 45-20-1(a), -6(a) (Supp. 2013); O.C.G.A. §§ 49-5-3(3), (5), (12), (16), -8(a)(1) and 
(2), -41(e), -60(3), -110(2), -131(2), -154, -281(a)(15) and (18) (2013); O.C.G.A. § 52-7-12 (Supp. 
2013). 
 301. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1 (Supp. 2013) (replacing Code section 15-11-28 with 15-11-560). 
 302. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 16-5-45(a)(1) (Supp. 2013) (changing “deprived” to “dependent” and 
“unruly” to “child in need of services”). 
 303. See O.C.G.A. § 17-4-25.1 (2013); see also House Committee Feb. 13 Video, supra note 1, at 26 
min., 34 sec. (testimony by Hon. Michael P. Boggs, Co-Chair of the Special Council on Criminal Justice 
Reform and Judge in the Court of Appeals of Georgia). 
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modifies the definition of prosecuting attorney. 304  The amended 
definition acknowledges that state, county, and local governments 
have limited resources.305 Consequently, in some circumstances, a 
district attorney may not be available to represent the state in juvenile 
court proceedings.306 The amended definition of prosecuting attorney 
permits the court to appoint a qualified attorney to represent the state 
in prosecuting a delinquency case.307 This amendment ensures that, 
where a district attorney is unable to represent the state because of 
staffing concerns, a qualified attorney represents the state’s 
interests.308 
Analysis 
The rewrite of Georgia’s Juvenile Court Code was a massive 
undertaking spanning the breadth of nearly a decade.309 The resulting 
Act reflects years of public input, well-researched and documented 
improvements, and thoughtful collaboration among diverse 
stakeholders.310 The unanimity of the Act’s passage during the 2013 
legislative session speaks volumes of its quality.311 However, the 
sheer length of the Act suggests revisions will likely follow in future 
legislative sessions.312 Furthermore, the Act’s sponsors suggest that 
while the Act sets forth a solid foundation for an improved juvenile 
court code, certain ongoing juvenile justice reform efforts are likely 
to occur within the next few years to address areas of the juvenile 
justice system not contemplated by the Act.313 For example, the 
proposed model code developed in 2008 contained recommendations 
to “[i]ncrease the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to 18 for all 
children” and to “[r]epeal SB 440 and all other automatic waiver 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 304. O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6.1 (Supp. 2013). 
 305. See House Committee Feb. 19 Video, supra note 67, at 0 min., 0 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell 
Willard (R-51st)). 
 306. Id. 
 307. O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6.1(d) (Supp. 2013). 
 308. O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6.1 (Supp. 2013); see also House Committee Feb. 19 Video, supra note 67, at 
20 min., 59 sec. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard (R-51st)). 
 309. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See Oliver Interview, supra note 5. 
 312. See Carter Interview, supra note 6. 
 313. See Oliver Interview, supra note 5; see also Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
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laws and allow only for discretionary judicial waiver of juvenile 
court jurisdiction through a transfer hearing[,]” 314 but neither were 
included in the Act due to their potentially divisive nature.315 Finally, 
legislative action may be necessary to address concerns over how the 
changes required by HB 242 will be initially funded. 
SB 440 was enacted in 1994 in response to a rise in juvenile 
violent crime clogging up juvenile courts with “‘hardened youth.’”316 
SB 440 granted the superior courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
juveniles accused of murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, 
aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual 
battery, and armed robbery committed with a firearm.317 Prior to 
passage of SB 440, juvenile courts had concurrent jurisdiction with 
superior courts over those offenders and a lengthy hearing was 
required to transfer a case from juvenile to superior court.318 SB 440 
generally eliminated the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over cases 
involving the aforementioned crimes while permitting the district 
attorney to decline to prosecute such children and allowing the 
superior court to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court under 
certain circumstances.319 Nearly two decades after the passage of SB 
440, some legislators, including Representative Oliver (D-82nd), 
questioned the efficacy of trying juveniles as adults.320 However, 
aware the topic would likely entail extensive debate, some sponsors 
of the HB 242 felt it would be wise to table the issue for future 
legislative action in order to assure passage of the Act.321 
Likewise, sponsors of the Act chose to table debate about raising 
the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to age eighteen.322 Georgia is 
one of only twelve states that does not establish seventeen as the 
upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction.323 Raising the age 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 314. McGrath, supra note 7, at v. 
 315. See Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
 316. Amy Wolverton, Juvenile Proceedings, Parental Rights, 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 81, 82 (1994). 
 317. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-560(b) (Supp. 2013) (formerly codified at Code section 
15-11-5(b)(2)(A)). 
 318. Wolverton, supra note 316, at 83. 
 319. Id. 
 320. See Oliver Interview, supra note 5. 
 321. See Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Sarah Alice Brown, Trends in Juvenile Justice State Legislation: 2001–2011, Nat’l Conference 
of State Legislatures, 4 (2012), available at  
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf. 
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would create uniformity with recent constitutional determinations 
about permissible punishments for children under eighteen by the 
U.S. Supreme Court based on the latest research about adolescent 
brain development and maturity.324 Sponsors of the Act recognized 
that it was premature to attempt to raise the juvenile court 
jurisdictional age due to a lack of information about the fiscal impact 
and whether the DJJ was equipped to handle the influx of cases 
involving seventeen year olds.325 Interestingly, however, research 
indicates that moving sixteen and seventeen year old juveniles from 
the adult criminal justice system into the juvenile justice system 
generally gives a $3 return in benefits for every $1 in cost.326 Time 
will tell whether legislation broadening the juvenile courts’ 
jurisdiction will be introduced or passed, but the debate will likely 
involve asking who should bear the costs of prosecuting and 
punishing this cohort of children. 
In fact, while the Act sets forth a vision and framework for many 
much-needed changes, only time will tell if the earmarked money 
and anticipated savings will sufficiently fund the changes the Act 
requires of counties and courts throughout the state. For instance, 
Governor Nathan Deal (R) pledged $5 million of his budget for the 
2014 fiscal year to fund evidence based community alternatives to 
detention.327 As of the June 21, 2013 deadline for grant applications, 
grant proposals amounting to $10.2 million—over double the amount 
allocated—were submitted by 57 of Georgia’s 159 counties.328 Some 
counties are concerned that the additional costs of many expanded 
juvenile court requirements will fall on local taxpayers in the absence 
of sufficient state funding.329 For example, in Chatham County, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 324. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (holding mandatory life without 
parole for juveniles under eighteen unconstitutional), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2030 (2010) (holding life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders under eighteen 
unconstitutional), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (holding the 
death penalty for juveniles under eighteen unconstitutional). 
 325. See Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
 326. Brown, supra note 323, at 4–5. 
 327. See Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
 328. Rhonda Cook, Applications for Grants Could Cover 75 Percent of Kids at Risk of Becoming 
Criminals, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 4, 2013, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/applications-for-
grants-could-cover-75-percent-of-/nYc3b/. Grant monies totaling $4.7 million were awarded to forty-
four counties in July 2013. Juvenile Programs in 44 Counties Awarded New Grants, JUSTGeorgia, 
www.justga.org/juvenile-programs-in-44-counties-awarded-new-grants (last visited July 28, 2013). 
 329. Marcus E. Howard, Chatham County Braces for Juvenile Justice Reform Costs, SAVANNAH 
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are concerns over how to fund the new requirement that delinquent 
and dependent juveniles all be represented by counsel.330 Moreover, 
the requirement that the district attorney’s office handle certain 
responsibilities previously handled by court workers is also projected 
to increase costs.331 In order to allay some of these fears, Governor 
Deal (R) pledged to continue to support state funding as long as he is 
governor.332 The Governor further anticipates the Act will save the 
state a significant amount of money which will subsequently be re-
invested in the local programs producing documented positive results 
in their communities.333 Overall, optimism is reasonable based on the 
research provided by the Pew Center to the Governor’s Special 
Council that found the changes required by HB 242 will save 
taxpayer dollars in the long run.334 Even so, local counties are 
understandably nervous about implementing the changes as they 
await the investment from those projected savings. 
Jason Carruthers & Jessica Sully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
MORNING NEWS, June 15, 2013, available at http://www.savannahnow.com/news/2013-06-15/chatham-
county-braces-juvenile-justice-reform-costs#.UexbEY2yCn9. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See Willard Interview, supra note 23. 
 333. Id. Once the Act goes into effect, a savings of as much as $85 million is expected over a five 
year period. Cook, supra note 328. 
 334. Council Report, supra note 36, at 2. 
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